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Plurality in environmental supply chain mechanisms: Differential 
effects on triple bottom line outcomes  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Buying firms are being increasingly confronted with alarming incidents of non-compliance with 
respect to sustainability along their upstream supply chains (e.g., Wilhelm et al., 2016); these 
incidents have continually harmed the performance of the buying firm (Hartmann and Moeller, 
2014). Among others, the suppliers of McDonald’s were not only criticized, but even fined by the 
Chinese government for water and environmental pollution (Hewitt, 2015; Mozur, 2013). 
Accordingly, buying firms are mandated to take substantial measures to prevent these looming 
sustainability concerns in their upstream supply chains through adequate management of suppliers’ 
environmental practices (e.g., Blome et al., 2014a; Paulraj, 2011; Reuter et al., 2010); this is clearly 
evident in very recent changes of environmental supply chain mechanisms of firms like Apple 
(Vaughan, 2016) and Ford (Hardcastle, 2015). Research has closely analyzed the different 
mechanisms that are adopted by firms to encourage as well as manage the environmental 
practices in supplier firms (e.g., Blome et al., 2014b; Gimenez and Sierra, 2013; Paulraj, 2011; 
Paulraj et al., 2014; Tachizawa et al., 2012; Vachon and Klassen, 2006). This literature broadly 
characterizes environmentally-oriented supply chain mechanisms into two broad categories: 
environmental collaboration (EC) and environmental evaluation (EE). EC is a relational 
mechanism (Macneil, 1980) as it represents a soft and trust based approach in achieving 
improved performance, while EE is a transactional mechanism (Williamson, 1985) as it focuses 
on a hard, fact-based analysis of performance that might also lead to improved performance.  
Following the notions of plurality introduced by Cannon et al. (2000) and Poppo and 
Zenger (2002), extant supply chain management research has acknowledged the fact that both 
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these mechanisms can have a complementary effect (e.g., Gimenez and Sierra, 2013; Krause et 
al., 2000; Lee and Klassen, 2008; Rao, 2002; Reuter et al., 2010; Vachon and Klassen, 2006; 
Tachizawa et al., 2012). With the exception of the works of Gimenez and Sierra (2013) and 
Tachizawa et al. (2012), empirical evidence on the complementary effects has been predominantly 
based on the case study approach. More importantly, as opposed to complementary effects, 
management scholars also suggest that too much evaluation could drive out collaboration in a 
buyer-supplier relationship (e.g., Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Woolthuis et al., 2005) or higher-
levels of collaboration might actually make evaluation unnecessary (e.g., Cannon et al., 2000). 
So, could EC and EE substitute for each other instead? Unfortunately, extant research does not 
explicitly test for this substitutionary effect. But this is a very important question for managers, 
especially in times when the business case for environmental sustainability is still actively 
debated (Kiron et al., 2012). If EC and EE are substitutable, then managers could actually 
achieve higher levels of performance without sacrificing additional resources. Currently, firms 
use a mix of EC and EE mechanisms. For example, Ford shares best environmental practices 
with its suppliers in a collaborative fashion while it simultaneously audits its suppliers 
(Hardcastle, 2015), without potentially knowing the benefits of these different mechanisms. 
On a related note, when it comes to the performance impacts of the plural forms of 
environmental supply chain mechanisms, empirical research focuses only on environmental 
performance (e.g., Gimenez and Sierra, 2013; Tachizawa et al., 2012). But considering all 
aspects of the triple bottom line performance is of equal managerial importance as it could help 
unearth the differential performance effects of the plural forms of EC and EE. Specifically, firms 
and managers are nowadays asked by stakeholders to measure all dimensions of the triple bottom 
line so as to show a balanced performance (Painter-Morland, 2006). Against this backdrop, the 
research question driving this research effort is “whether (or how) EC and EE could be used in 
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conjunction to better impact the focal firm’s triple bottom line performance”. Given that relational 
exchange theory (RET) and transaction cost economics (TCE) can both inform different aspects 
revolving around the simultaneous pursuit of EC and EE, we draw upon these theoretical 
perspectives to ground our hypotheses.  
In following through with the stated research goal, our study makes several compelling 
contributions. First, we extend current research by documenting the intricacies in the plural forms 
of environmental supply chain mechanisms, thereby providing support for both complementarity 
as well as substitutability that is inherent in these mechanisms (Denison et al., 1995). This is also 
valuable to managers as conflicting mechanisms could be avoided or resources could be saved due 
to the complementary nature of mechanisms. Second, as pointed out earlier, empirical research on 
the complementarity between EC and EE includes only environmental performance. But as evident 
from our results, it is important to augment current research as well as managerial insights by 
including all aspects of the triple bottom line (i.e., economic, environmental, and social measures). 
Specifically, our results suggest that the simultaneous presence of EC and EE can have 
significantly intriguing effects on economic, environmental and social performance. In general, no 
matter the outcome variable, our results clearly show that EC and EE could act as complements 
when they both are maintained at relatively the same level. On the other hand, when EC and EE 
are maintained at dissimilar levels, their effects are unique for different outcome measures. 
Specifically, when considering economic performance, our results suggest that high levels of either 
transactional or relational mechanisms could hurt the generation of relational rents only in a purely 
economic sense. Alternatively, while considering firm’s environmental and social performance 
measures, high levels of EC do not have a detrimental effect on the outcome variables. These 
findings clearly document that the nature of plurality in EC and EE depends very much on the 
triple bottom line outcome measure being considered. These insights carry significant weight for 
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practicing managers. In general, it seems preferable to balance EC and EE; but if exceptional 
environmental and social performance is targeted, then firms might risk economic benefits. Thus it 
is up to the manager to identify the most important strategic priority of the firm and then pursue EE 
and EC at appropriate levels as identified in our findings. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we discuss the theoretical background 
of the study, specifically exploring transactional and relational mechanisms as well as their plural 
forms. Next, we provide the theoretical underpinning of the hypotheses that will be tested. 
Subsequently, we explain the methodology adopted to answer the proposed hypotheses. The final 
section presents not only the discussion of our observations along with their theoretical and 
managerial implications, but also the limitations of our study and future research opportunities. 
 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Environmental Supply Chain Mechanisms 
Supply chain mechanisms help firms to address safeguarding, cooperation, and coordination in 
buyer-supplier relationships. Extant research suggests that the management of these relationships 
can consist of different “building blocks” stemming from markets, hierarchies, and partnerships 
(Cannon et al., 2000). Specifically, extant research distinguishes between two broad forms of 
mechanisms – transactional and relational (Heide, 1994; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Liu et al., 2009). 
Along a similar vein, we follow Vachon and Klassen (2006) and propose two mechanisms – EC 
and EE – that are prevalent in managing environmental practices of the suppliers. Specifically, we 
envision them to reflect “actual operative practice[s], which are brought to bear between two 
parties” (Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009, p. 1027).  
 Transactional Mechanisms. Transactional mechanisms originate from economics 
literature that uses TCE as its guiding theoretical framework. Following the tenets of TCE, 
5 
 
transactional mechanisms consider supplier relationships as discrete transactions and manage them 
with the ambition of curbing opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1985). These activities are 
control-based in that they focus purely on influencing exchange partners' action through contracts 
and/or monitoring (Genctürk and Aulakh, 2007). Though a variety of transactional mechanisms 
exist, scholars have predominantly focused on the existence of formal contracts (Lusch and Brown, 
1996). Alternatively, with the understanding that contracts alone do not suffice for ensuring 
compliance, other transactional mechanisms have also been highlighted. For example, Hoetker and 
Mellewigt (2009) show that monitoring can also help in better coordinating supply chain activities. 
Liu et al. (2009) justify the appropriateness of legal stipulation and incentive systems.  
 Contracts are ex-ante measures to reduce uncertainty; however, in the case of 
environmental management, contracts are less effective given the lack of well-formed objectives 
and the issue of performance ambiguity makes ex-post evaluation of contractual compliance 
difficult (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Thus, instead of focusing on ex-ante measures like 
contracts, we believe that EE, an important measure of environmental processes, can better capture 
transactional mechanisms in use. Following Vachon and Klassen, (2006), we conceptualize EE to 
involve monitoring and assessment that is focused on gathering and processing environmentally-
oriented information. Additionally, our conceptualization of EE signifies the use of arms-length 
mechanisms that focus mainly on controlling the outcome of the suppliers’ environmental efforts.  
 Relational Mechanisms. Relational mechanisms originate from the relationship literature 
that is modelled after RET. So, these mechanisms take historical and social context into account 
when managing buyer-supplier relationships (Macneil, 1980; Heide, 1994). Unlike transactional 
mechanisms, relational mechanisms are based on moral norms that emerge from expected 
behaviors of the exchange partners as well as their internalized values (Bensaou and Venkatraman, 
1995; Genctürk and Aulakh, 2007; Liu et al., 2009). As these mechanisms are social in nature, they 
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thrive on open communication, trust, solidarity, social identification, and joint cooperation (Heide 
and John, 1992; Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009). Accordingly, such norm-based mechanisms can 
help in developing relation-specific assets, knowledge-sharing routines, as well as complementary 
resources (Dyer and Singh, 1998).  
 In line with the norms of RET, we follow Vachon and Klassen (2006) and conceptualize 
EC to reflect the direct involvement of the buying firm in planning and managing the 
environmental capabilities of the supplier. Unlike EE, the focus is on collaboration wherein the 
supply partners work together to not only reduce the environmental impact of their combined 
products and processes, but also to enhance the overall environmental prowess of the supplier firm 
(Bowen et al., 2001; Gimenez and Sierra, 2013). It also signifies the willingness of the partner 
firms to commit financial as well as non-financial resources to address their combined 
environmental goals (Paulraj, 2011). Accordingly, given that EC refers to the extent to which the 
partners work together to achieve mutual environmental goals, it is clearly a relational mechanism 
that could facilitate a good understanding of the complementarities that exist among the 
capabilities of the partner firms.  
Plural View of Relational and Transactional Mechanisms 
Historically, relational and transactional mechanisms were generally considered to be at the two 
ends of a continuum. Some researchers suggest that the existence of one mechanism may in fact 
prevent the adoption of another (Larson, 1992; Gulati, 1995); i.e., the existence of a monitoring 
mindset may deter the development of relational norms in the relationship (e.g., Ghoshal and 
Moran, 1996; Woolthuis et al., 2005); close cooperation between exchange partners might make 
transactional mechanisms like monitoring unnecessary (e.g., Gulati, 1995; Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Cannon et al., 2000). On the other hand, proponents espousing the pluralistic view have shown that 
a combination of transactional and relational mechanisms might actually be beneficial. For 
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example, Poppo and Zenger (2002) and Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995) have empirically 
established that performance improvements could be significantly higher when both transactional 
and relational mechanisms were used jointly than when they were used in isolation. Similar effects 
have been documented by other scholars including Cannon et al. (2000), Liu et al. (2009), and Li et 
al. (2010). In summary, organizational scholars generally acknowledge the plurality of these 
mechanisms. 
But apart from case study evidences that environmental supply chain mechanisms (EC and 
EE) could act in a synergistic manner (e.g., Lee and Klassen, 2008; Reuter et al., 2010), the testing 
of a pluralist view of EC and EE is still nascent with two laudable exceptions. Following the 
synergistic effect proposed by Lee and Klassen (2008), Tachizawa et al. (2012) were among the 
first to empirically study plural environmental supply chain mechanisms. Based on a sample of 
Spanish firms, they explore different clusters of environmental strategies, namely high 
collaboration / high evaluation, high evaluation / low collaboration and low collaboration / low 
evaluation. Based on ANOVA, they provide evidence that different strategies are not only 
possible, but could also have differential effect on environmental performance. But interestingly, 
they did not include a high collaboration / low evaluation configuration in their analysis. Gimenez 
and Sierra (2013) extend this research by investigating the links of collaboration and evaluation on 
environmental performance. Besides other results, using a sample of Spanish and German firms as 
well as the ANOVA methodology, the authors find support for the fact that there are not only 
different configurations (i.e., plural forms) of collaboration and evaluation, but also higher levels of 
collaboration and assessment is linked to higher levels of environmental performance.  
Both these studies provide important insights into the fact that different combinations of 
EC and EE can have differential impact on environmental performance. However, what is missing 
is an empirical enquiry into the impact on the economic and social dimensions of triple bottom line 
8 
 
performance. Additionally, it is also important to conduct a more nuanced investigation on whether 
these mechanisms could act as complements and/or substitutes. Such an enquiry needs a more 
robust methodology than ANOVA. Specifically, organizational scholars suggest that the 
polynomial regression approach is a simple, yet, robust methodology when testing for congruence 
– i.e., complementarity and/or substitutability (e.g., Edwards, 2001; Meilich, 2006). Accordingly, 
we use polynomial regression analysis along with response surface methodology to gain a fine-
grained understanding of the effect of plural forms of EC and EE on triple bottom line 
performance.  
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Since we study plural forms of EC and EE, our hypotheses focus on interaction effects. But 
our view of interaction does not follow the traditional contingency approach which allows only for 
multiplicative effects; while this approach could help us to study complementary effects, it does 
not specifically assess for substitutionary effects. Therefore, we use the polynomial regression 
analysis as this allows us to model both interaction and curvilinear effects; this approach helps us 
to better understand whether these mechanisms act as complements or supplements through the 
evaluation of a three-dimensional surface map (Please refer to Edwards (1994) and Lambert et al. 
(2003) for a detailed review). We hypothesize along the symmetry as well as the asymmetry lines 
of the response surface (Please refer to Figure 1); while the symmetry line reflects the 
simultaneous increase in EC and EE, the asymmetry line reflects the increase in EC and the 
simultaneous decrease in EE. Additionally, we concentrate on the beginning, middle, and end 
points along the symmetry and asymmetry lines with the ambition of presenting the theoretical 
justification for our hypotheses clearly.  
-------------------------------- 




Economic Performance  
We propose that economic performance will be rather low when both EC and EE are low because 
the buying firm will have minimal knowledge about the environmental prowess of the supplier 
firm. As advocated by both TCE and RET, EC and EE in such cases will not be mature enough for 
the focal firm to understand the supplier processes, their environmental capabilities, as well as the 
problems that could exist within the supplier organization (e.g., Williamson, 1991; Heide and John, 
1992; Genctürk and Aulakh, 2007). According to TCE, the level of opportunism is bound to be 
high in such relationships and the supplier's environmental behavior could have a detrimental 
effect on the buyer’s performance, thereby resulting in higher governance cost. Alternatively, as 
per RET, relatively low levels of collaboration will limit mutual benefits as both partners will not 
invest intensely in their relationship.  
On the other hand, at medium and high levels of EC and EE, economic performance will be 
at a medium and high level respectively. The underlying logic is that by exercising higher levels of 
EC and EE the buying firm will be able to develop a greater understanding of the supplier 
processes. This would entail the buying firm to regularly monitor supplier operations, exchange 
information, and jointly work on environmental innovations. As these relationships extend over a 
longer period of time, the partners will learn each other’s behavior, gain a clear understanding of 
the synergies that exist between their processes, and treat their counterpart equally well so as to 
sustain the relationship (Chen et al., 2004; Zollo et al., 2002). Relational norms will also help in 
avoiding performance-destroying opportunism (e.g., Heide and John, 1992; Macneil, 1980). The 
simultaneous presence of EE along with EC would signal that the buyer side is not only acting in 
self-interest, but is also interested in nurturing the overall relationship with the supplier. More 
importantly, monitoring activities could also serve as a "safety-net" if in case relational 
mechanisms, as advocated by TCE, give way to opportunism (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). 
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Therefore, though EE is a transactional mechanism, when taken together with EC, it would rather 
serve as a cross-checking mechanism that can not only help in the identification of problem areas 
within the supplier firm, but also in subsequent resolutions through effective future collaboration. 
In summary, we propose that EC and EE could act as complements when it comes to economic 
performance. Therefore, 
H1a: EC and EE will have a complementary effect on economic performance. In other words, 
there will be a linear effect on the symmetry line. 
 
When considering the asymmetry line, we propose that economic performance will suffer 
if there is an imbalance in the level of EC and EE. In other words, we propose that these 
mechanisms cannot substitute for each other and that the mid-levels of EC and EE will result in the 
best economic performance along the asymmetry line (as the mid-point reflects complementarity 
and moving further away from it suggests substitutionary effect). From the purely economic sense, 
high level of EC comes at a considerable cost as it signifies direct involvement as well as 
investment of resources from the buying firm (Larson, 1992; Klassen and Vachon, 2003; Vachon 
and Klassen, 2006). In other words, working jointly on environmental innovations would require 
more time, effort, and resources from the buying firm. Additionally, blindly trusting as well as 
investing in partners, without extensive evaluative mechanisms to ensure satisfactory performance, 
could in itself be a source of opportunism (Cannon et al., 2000). If the suppliers detect that the 
buying firm does not “care” about their output, they might rather be motivated to act 
opportunistically by cutting corners (Williamson, 1985). For example, if the buying firm requires 
the supplier to pursue environmental-friendly procedures but never checks or audits the supplier’s 
operations, then the supplier might perceive that compliance is unimportant and might 
opportunistically signal its compliance without implementing required practices. Therefore, 
partners should also pay attention to the performance of the supplier to improve the 
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environmentally-oriented performance of the relationship as well as value the supplier’s efforts. 
Similarly, a relatively high level of EE with rather low levels of EC will not only result in a lack of 
trust, but will also dissipate the relational rents that could be gained through the relationship. 
Additionally, when transactional mechanisms are implemented on a high level, they might hamper 
the performance of the relationship, as intense monitoring comes at a cost for both parties. Thus,  
H1b: EC and EE will not function as substitutes in explaining economic performance. In other 
words, there will be an inverted U-shaped curvature on the asymmetry line. 
 
Environmental and Social Performance  
When EC and EE are focused on environmental management, they could lead to improved 
environmental and social performance as well. Therefore, the arguments for economic 
performance can also be applied within environmental and social performance context as the 
simultaneous adoption of control and collaboration can help minimizing the likelihood of 
opportunism in environmental issues. Furthermore, environmental and social performance will 
improve if firms jointly innovate environmentally-friendly products, streamline their processes to 
avoid waste, and jointly manage product and process safety (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Paulraj, 2011). 
By simultaneously collaborating on environmental issues and evaluating supplier environmental 
practices, both firms can benefit by identifying and honing the complementary environmentally-
oriented resources that exist in the relationship. Moreover, the elevated level of trust inherent in 
relationships signified by relatively high EC can alter supplier perceptions and dissipate the 
negative effects of the transactional mechanisms in play (Frey, 1997). The supplier would thus 
consider these controls mechanisms as positive reinforcements given their ability to not only 
resolve problem areas through further collaboration, but also to establish a basis for the 
development of future shared environmental expectations (e.g., Cannon et al., 2000). Accordingly, 
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we hypothesize that low, medium, and high levels of EC and EE could result in corresponding 
levels of environmental and social performance along the symmetry line. 
H2a: EC and EE will have a complementary effect on environmental performance. In other 
words, there will be a linear effect on the symmetry line. 
 
H2b: EC and EE will have a complementary effect on social performance. In other words, there 
will be a linear effect on the symmetry line. 
 
Unlike economic performance, we believe to see different effects along the asymmetry line 
for environmental and social performance. The resources to govern the relationship are included as 
management costs only in an economic sense. Therefore, pursuing higher levels of either EE or EC 
might have a beneficial effect from an environmental and social performance point of view. We 
contend that environmental and social performance will be at a higher level when either EE is high 
and EC is low or EE is low and EC is high, since behavioural uncertainty is comparably high in the 
environmental and social performance domain as performance measures are more difficult to 
quantify and measure when compared to the economic domain. In other words, we propose that EE 
and EC can substitute for each other in impacting environmental and social performance. 
Therefore, it might be beneficial in pursuing more extreme environmental supply chain 
mechanisms – whether transactional or relational (e.g., Gundlach and Murphy, 1993; Rindfleisch 
and Heide, 1997). For example, as advocated by TCE, it is necessary to pursue intense monitoring 
as only this would guarantee that the supplier is not behaving opportunistically and is putting every 
effort to satisfy the environmental requirements of the focal firm (Williamson, 1985). Similarly, in 
the case of increased EC, trust between partners will increase, thereby enabling them to enhance 
their capabilities, rectify their limitations, and minimize the detrimental effects of behavioral 
uncertainty (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Paulraj, 2011).  
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On the contrary, when EC and EE are at moderate levels, the supplier will be uncertain 
about the intentions of the focal firm and rather view the relationship as characterized by mixed 
signals (e.g., Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). Accordingly, moderate levels of these mechanisms will 
impose a psychological barrier that will distance the partner firms, whereby the supplier will be 
reluctant to participate in the environmental initiatives as well as share knowledge, resources, and 
capabilities that could significantly augment the environmental and social performance of the focal 
firm (Granovetter, 1985). Therefore, 
H2c: EC and EE will function as substitutes in explaining environmental performance. In other 
words, there will be a U-shaped curvature on the asymmetry line. 
 
H2d: EC and EE will function as substitutes in explaining social performance. In other words, 




Data for this study was collected from high-ranking purchasing/supply chain executives. The initial 
sample of 2,500 members was obtained from the Institute for Supply Management (ISM). This list 
covered manufacturing firms representing the SIC codes 20, 23, 25, 28, 29, 35, 36, 37, and 39. All 
indicators were measured using a 7-point Likert scale. Indicators representing EC and EE were 
captured using end points of strongly disagree and strongly agree; indicators measuring 
performance were captured using end points of decreased significantly and increased significantly 
as they were assessed based on the change in performance in the last two/ three years. The 
respondents were advised to answer supplier-related indicators based on their top key suppliers that 




Data was collected in two stages – first step involved the mail survey approach while the 
second step involved the web survey approach. The mail survey approach adopted a modified 
version of Dillman’s total design method (Dillman, 2007). The survey was sent to a randomly 
selected list of 1,000 respondents. While 38 surveys were returned undelivered, 26 of the potential 
respondents replied stating that they could not participate in the study due to company policy, lack 
of experience, etc. This reduced the effective sample size to 936 participants. From this list, 114 
responses were received (12.2% response rate). We discarded 12 responses due to incompleteness, 
thereby reducing the usable sample size to 102 (i.e., effective response rate = 10.9%). As indicated 
earlier, the second stage involved the web survey approach. Since email addresses of the potential 
respondents were not provided by ISM, the web survey approach included two steps. A total of 
466 respondents were selected randomly from the remaining list of 1,500 respondents (as 1,000 
was selected for the mail survey). These respondents were sent a cover letter explaining the 
research project along with a consent form to notify their willingness to participate in the study. 
Forty seven consent forms were found undeliverable and were returned back. From the remaining 
419 potential respondents, 125 returned their consent forms, with 59 of them consenting to 
participate. A link to the web-survey was emailed to these 59 participants; a total of 44 completed 
the web survey. After discarding 1 response due to incompleteness, we ended up with a usable 
sample of 43 in this stage of data collection (i.e., response rate = 12.18%). The final usable sample 
was 145 (final response rate of 11.25%). The final sample included a total of 136 high-ranking 
purchasing executives (i.e., president, vice president, director, and purchasing manager). The 
respondents also had an average experience of 5.8 years in environmental initiatives. 
Measures 
EC includes indicators focusing on the firm’s willingness to not only cooperate with their 
suppliers, but also provide them with required resources to achieve their environmental objectives 
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(Bowen et al., 2001; Zhu and Sarkis, 2004; Vachon and Klassen, 2006). EE included items 
focusing on the firm’s ambition to monitor the environmental impact of suppliers’ internal 
products as well as processes (Walton et al., 1998; Bowen et al., 2001; Zhu and Sarkis, 2004; 
Vachon and Klassen, 2006). Economic Performance is measured by indicators covering 
improvements along cost and other financial measures (Menguc and Ozanne, 2005). Finally, 
environmental performance focused on improvements in emission and waste, usage of 
environmentally-safe materials, and energy savings (Zhu and Sarkis, 2004) and social performance 
focused on improvements along health and safety of not only the employees of the firm, but also its 
broader community (Bansal, 2005). In addition, we controlled for the performance impact of firm 
size using number of employees and annual sales volume (Paulraj et al., 2008). We also controlled 
for industry effects. Since SIC codes of 23, 25, and 29 were represented by less than or equal to 2 
responses, we created dummy variables for all other SIC codes (20, 28, 35, 36, 37, and 39).  
Non-response and Common Method Bias 
In order to test for non-response, we randomly selected 250 companies from the list of non-
respondents and gathered information on number of employees and annual sales volume from 
secondary data sources (Chen and Paulraj, 2004). The mean for the population was determined by 
combining the information of these 250 companies with the final sample of 145 firms. Comparison 
of demographic variables between the sample (i.e., 145) with this mean for the combined list of 
responding and 250 non-responding firms suggests that there are no statistically significant 
differences (at p < 0.01), suggesting that non-response bias is not a major issue. Additionally, we 
also conducted tests to determine whether the industry distribution (i.e., SIC codes) was similar 
among respondents and non-respondents. The chi-square test including the entire sample 
suggests that there is no significant difference among the two groups. 
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We assessed common method bias using the marker variable technique (Malhotra et al., 
2006). According to this technique, the second-smallest positive correlation among the indicators 
was considered as the marker variable. Subsequently, the correlation coefficient of the marker 
variable was used to adjust the zero order, statistically significant, correlations among all 
indicators. After this procedure, we found all zero order correlations to be statistically significant. 
Additionally, the maximum difference between the zero-order and the adjusted correlations was 
only 0.006, suggesting that CMB is not a major concern.  
Instrument Development 
Before evaluating the reliability and validity of the measurement items, the indicators 
were tested for the existence of outliers, and normality. Content validity of the instrument was 
established by pre-testing the instrument using researchers and practitioners. Five researchers as 
well as six senior purchasing executives reviewed the structure and the completeness of the survey 
(Dillman, 2007). We made minor modifications to the final instrument based on the suggestions 
made by these experts. Construct validity and unidimensionality were assessed using confirmatory 
factor analyses (CFA). Since different scale end points were used for performance and non-
performance indicators, we assessed two different measurement models. The model fit indices 
provided in Tables 1 and 2 illustrate that the model fits the data well and hence establishes 
unidimensionality. The path coefficients of all indicators were found to be significant. Two 
indicators were deleted during these analyses. 
Discriminant validity was established using the average variance extracted (AVE) values of 
the constructs (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). According to this test, constructs are discriminant if the 
squared correlation between each pair of constructs is less than the AVE of each those construct. 
As evident in Table 3, the square root of the AVE value for each individual construct was found to 
be lower than the respective correlations, thereby establishing discriminant validity. Cronbach’s 
17 
 
alpha as well as composite reliability (CR) values were used to establish reliability. As given in 
Tables 1 and 2, Cronbach’s alpha as well as CR values for all constructs were greater than 0.70, 
thereby ensuring that all theoretical constructs were reliable. In addition, all constructs except 
economic performance had AVE values that exceeded the threshold of 0.50. Even though the AVE 
value for economic performance surpassed this cutoff by deleting the third indicator (“decrease in 
fee for waste discharge”), we retained it due to the belief that it is a key economic aspect when 
focusing on environmental practices. In summary, the measurement instrument development 
process clearly shows that the theoretical constructs are reliable, valid, as well as unidimensional.  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1, 2, and 3 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
Hypothesis Testing 
The summary statistics as well as the correlation matrix are provided in Table 3. Given that we 
hypothesize linear as well curvilinear relationships between the theoretical constructs, a 
polynomial regression analysis that includes interaction as well as curvilinear effects was used. The 
scores for EC and EE were centered by subtracting the scale mid-point before creating the 
curvilinear and interaction terms, resulting in scores that range from -3 to +3. All variance inflation 
factor values were lower than 3, thereby confirming the absence of multicollinearity.  
Apart from testing the significance of the coefficients of EC and EE, we were also 
interested in investigating the significance of slopes and curvatures (i.e., for the response surfaces) 
that were generated by the polynomial regression analyses. We have provided a brief overview of 
the steps involved in deriving the slope and curvature of a response surface (these steps are similar 
to the approach adopted by Lado et al., (2008)). For a detailed description of this procedure, please 
refer to the works of Edwards and his colleagues (Edwards and Parry, 1993; Edwards, 1994; 
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Lambert et al., 2003). Generally, the following quadratic equation is required to study response 
surfaces using polynomial regression: 
 Z = b0 + b1 EC + b2 EE + b3 EC
2 + b4 EC * EE + b5 EE
2 + e         (1) 
In this equation, Z represents the outcome (performance) variable. The coefficients (b1 
through b5) refer to the unstandardized coefficients. Finally, e in the above equation represents the 
random disturbance term1. Our hypotheses do not focus on these coefficients directly. Instead, they 
relate to the slopes and curvatures of the surface along two lines ‘EE = EC’ and ‘EE = -EC’, 
referred to as the symmetry and asymmetry lines respectively (Edwards and Parry, 1993; Lambert 
et al., 2003). The symmetry line includes points where both EC and EE are same in terms of value 
and sign; the asymmetry line includes points where EC and EE are same in terms value, but not in 
terms of sign. To derive the surface along the symmetry and asymmetry line (as given in the 
following equations), we substitute EE = EC for the symmetry line and EE = -EC for asymmetry 
line in Equation 1:  
 Z = b0 + (b1+ b2) EC + (b3 + b4 + b5) EC
2 + e             (2) 
Z = b0 + (b1- b2) EC + (b3 - b4 + b5) EC
2 + e            (3) 
In the above equations, (b1 + b2) and (b1 – b2) represent the slopes along the symmetry and 
asymmetry lines respectively, while (b3 + b4 + b5) and (b3 – b4 + b5) represent the curvatures along 
the symmetry and asymmetry lines respectively. Now, to test the joint effect of EC and EE on the 
outcome variables, we evaluated these slopes and curvatures (Edwards and Parry, 1993). We did 
not find any of the dummy variables to be significant in the models evaluated. Accordingly, we 
                                                 
1 For all three polynomial regressions involving economic, environmental, and social performance, we checked to 
ensure that the disturbance terms (residuals) satisfied the assumptions of normality and heteroscedasticity. We used 
the univariate skewness and kurtosis statistics of the residuals to assess normality. The maximum absolute values of 
skewness and kurtosis of the residuals were 0.57 and 0.77 respectively. These values are well within the limits 
recommended by Curran et al. (1996) – skewness ≤ 2 and kurtosis ≤ 7. We tested heteroscedasticity using the 
White’s general test (White, 1980). The tests for all three polynomial regression models were insignificant at 95% 
significance level, suggesting that there is no evidence of heteroscedasticity. 
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removed the control variables and solved the polynomial regression models to arrive at the final 
results with the belief that it will help us to derive response surfaces that truly reflect the joint 
effects of EC and EE.  
Results 
Hypothesis 1 focused on the joint effects of EC and EE on economic performance. More 
specifically, since hypothesis H1a tests for the complementary effect of EC and EE, it predicted a 
linear effect along the symmetry line (i.e., significant positive slope and insignificant curvature). 
The results in Table 4 show that the slope (b1 + b2) of the symmetry line is significant (0.324; p < 
0.01), while the curvature (b3 + b4 + b5) was not (-0.013; ns). Thus, as EC and EE increased, 
economic performance continued to increase up to a certain level after which it starts to slightly 
diminish (though the curvature is not significant). In general, these results provide support for 
Hypothesis H1a, suggesting that there is complementarity between EC and EE when it comes to 
economic performance. On the other hand, hypothesis H1b predicted EC and EE cannot substitute 
for each other (i.e., an inverted U-shaped curvature – insignificant slope and significant negative 
curvature). The slope (b1 – b2) along the asymmetry line was found to be negative and insignificant 
(-0.076; ns), while the curvature (b3 – b4 + b5) was found to be negative and significant (-0.361; p < 
0.05). The sign and significance of the curvature clearly suggests that there is an inverted U-shape 
along the asymmetry line; thereby providing sufficient support for hypothesis H1b. In general, this 
result suggests that EC and EE cannot function as substitutes within the context of economic 
performance. More interestingly, the result along the asymmetry line provides additional support to 
the notion of “alignment” or "complements", in that at extreme levels of mismatch (misalignment) 
between EC and EE, economic performance seems to be worse; while at higher levels of alignment 
between EC and EE (i.e., towards the center of the asymmetry line), economic performance seems 
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to be greatly improved. Figure 2 presents the surface for these hypotheses from two different 
angles (for better clarity).  
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 and Figure 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
Hypothesis 2 focused on the joint effects of EC and EE on a) environmental and b) social 
performance. H2a predicted that EC and EE will have a complementary effect on environmental 
performance (i.e., significant positive slope and insignificant curvature) and H2b predicted the same 
for social performance. Table 4 shows that all coefficients, except EC, were insignificant. In 
addition, while the symmetry line’s slope was significant for environmental performance (0.530; p 
< 0.01) and social performance (0.429; p < 0.01), the curvature for both environmental 
performance (-0.015; ns) and social performance (0.011; ns) were not. These results provide 
support for Hypothesis H2a and H2b. On the other hand, hypothesis H2c and H2d predicted that EC 
and EE will function as substitutes in the case of environmental and social performance (i.e., a U-
shaped curvature – insignificant slope and significant positive curvature). The slope along the 
asymmetry line was found to be marginally significant for environmental performance (0.320; p < 
0.10) and insignificant for social performance (0.267; ns) for social performance. The curvature 
was not significant for both environmental performance (0.207; ns) and social performance (0.009; 
ns). Though in the expected direction (i.e., positive), given that the curvatures were not significant, 
hypothesis H2c and H2d were not supported. The response surface for these hypotheses is presented 
in Figures 3 and 4.  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 3 and 4about here 
-------------------------------------- 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Discussion of Results and Theoretical Implications 
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Past studies that focus on both EC and EE explore their direct effects on environmentally-oriented 
practices. While such an enquiry has helped us gain useful insights into environmentally-oriented 
supply chain management, they do tremendous disservice to managers functioning in today's 
complex organizations (Lewis, 2000). Therefore, only research efforts that accept as well as test 
for the plurality of these supply chain mechanisms could help unfold the practical issues revolving 
around them. Accordingly, we build upon the works of Tachizawa et al. (2012) and Gimenez and 
Sierra (2013) and explore the joint effects of EC and EE on triple bottom line performance. More 
specifically, by using RET and TCE in conjunction, we aspire to increase our knowledge about 
these environmental supply chain mechanisms.  
In general, no matter the outcome variable, our results follow extant research (e.g., 
Gimenez and Sierra, 2013; Lee and Klassen, 2008; Reuter et al., 2010; Tachizawa et al., 2012) and 
show that EC and EE could act as complements when they both are maintained at relatively the 
same level (i.e., along the symmetry line). In other words, higher levels of transactional 
mechanisms (EE) need not be detrimental to environmental and social performance of the focal 
firm as far as relational mechanisms (EC) are also maintained at the same level. The logical 
assumption that elaborate use of monitoring mechanisms might convey mixed messages, thereby 
leading the supply partner to not open up as well as stifle joint opportunities seems to be a fallacy. 
Alternatively, following the "trust-but-verify" approach advocated by Lewicki et al. (1998), it 
would rather be beneficial for the focal firm to adopt a "collaborate-and-evaluate" approach within 
the environmental context. In other words, while high level of relational mechanisms enables the 
development of self-enforcing behavior that personifies trust and commitment (Dyer and Singh, 
1998), the transactional mechanisms might serve in a reinforcing role to enrich the exchange 
relationship between the partners (Lado et al., 2008). More specifically, when taken together with 
EC, EE could not only serve as a cross-checking mechanism that can help in the identification as 
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well as a smooth resolution of environmental problems, but also as a litmus test of past 
collaborative efforts that could enable more in-depth and focused future collaboration between the 
partners, thereby enhancing the strategic synchronization of inter-organizational environmental 
practices. In addition to providing fine-grained support for the findings of Tachizawa et al. (2012) 
and Gimenez and Sierra (2013) with respect to environmental performance, our study also 
empirically establishes that similar complementary effects could be realizable in the case of 
economic and social performance measures as well.  
On the other hand, when looking along the asymmetry line, our results show that the effects 
of EC and EE are unique for different triple bottom line outcome measures; this finding presents 
new insights, over and beyond extant literature, on the plural forms of these mechanisms. 
Specifically, when considering economic performance, we hypothesized that there will be an 
inverted U-shaped curvature (non-substitutionary effect) along the asymmetry line (H1b). In finding 
strong support for this hypothesis, we find that EC and EE cannot substitute for each other when it 
comes to economic performance. In other words, we bring to light that "too much of a good thing" 
could be a recipe for economic performance failure. Specifically, focusing on a single mechanism 
is not advisable as "it can blind managers and tether their organizations to a confining set of skills, 
concerns, and environmental states" (Miller, 1993, p. 130). Following this notion of "single-
mindedness", our results suggest that high levels of either transactional mechanisms or relational 
mechanisms could hurt the generation of relational rents in a purely economic sense.  
Alternatively, while considering environmental and social performance, we hypothesized 
that EE and EC can function as substitutes. In other words, we proposed that whenever EC and EE 
are at moderate levels the relationship will be characterized by mixed signals, which could in turn 
have a detrimental effect on the outcome variables (Granovetter, 1985; Lado et al., 2008). 
Interestingly, both these hypotheses (H2b and H3b) were not supported, suggesting that EC and EE 
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cannot substitute for each other and that the moderate levels of EC and EE need not characterize 
mixed signals to the exchange partners. Instead, given the fact that behavioural uncertainty is 
comparably high, even moderate levels of EC seem to be sufficient to foster necessary cooperation 
between the partners insofar as it can negate any psychological barrier perceived due to the 
simultaneous adoption of EE. In other words, our result clearly shows that EC and EE cannot act as 
substitutes when considering environmental and social performance.  
Additionally, while using unbalanced environmental supply chain mechanisms 
(substitutionary effect), our results show that the level of environmental and social performance is 
higher when EC is high and EE is low than when EC is low and EE is high. In fact, when 
transactional mechanisms are high and relational mechanisms are low, the outcome measures are at 
a low level, suggesting that the simultaneous reduction in transactional mechanisms and 
improvement in relational mechanisms is conducive to these outcome measures. Though past 
management literature suggests that transactional mechanisms such as monitoring could provide 
effective control over moral hazards (e.g., Williamson, 1985; Genctürk and Aulakh, 2007), it 
seems that they are less effective within the environmental management context owing to high 
behavioral uncertainty and performance ambiguity (e.g., Wathne and Heide, 2000). On the 
contrary, as relational mechanisms are rooted in the norms of trust, commitment, as well as, 
solidarity and flexibility, they seem to inculcate partner behavior that is directed more towards 
maintaining the relationship over a period of time, jointly developing new environmentally-
friendly products and processes, and identifying new ways to use each other's strengths for the 
benefit of both parties. Accordingly, unlike EE, EC seems to have the unique ability to create a 
"clan" structure, which can facilitate an exchange relationship that is based on legitimate authority 
and mutual goals, thereby eliminating the need for explicit control mechanisms (Ouchi, 1980). In 
summary, given that environmental and social performance measures are concerned about the 
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holistic improvements in the environmental prowess of the firm, it seems that when environmental 
supply chain mechanisms are adopted in an unbalanced fashion, relational mechanisms are a better 
alternative to transactional mechanisms.  
Our findings pertaining to the substitutionary effects provide novel insights on the plural 
forms of EC and EE given that extant empirical research has not examined it. Additionally, the use 
of response surface methodology also helps us to provide a more nuanced explanation of the 
effects of plural forms. Specifically, it gives us the ability to compare configurations of high EC / 
low EE as well as low EC / high EE to that of high EC / high EE using a 3-dimensional surface 
map (Tachizawa et al. (2012) compare only a low collaboration / high evaluation configuration to 
that of high collaboration / high evaluation). Apart from complementarity, this comparison brings 
forth two further implications: First, even though EC and EE are complementary in nature, a close 
observation of Figures 3 and 4 suggests that high EC / low EE can in itself help in achieving higher 
levels of environmental and social performance; Second, when considering all aspects of the triple 
bottom line performance, complete complementarity (i.e., high EC and high EE) need not be the 
best configuration. Instead, somewhere between moderate to high EC and EE (along the symmetry 
line) will result in the highest levels of all triple bottom line performance dimensions.  
Managerial Implications 
Considering EC and EE in isolation can not only lead to waste of resources, but even diminish the 
performance effects of these mechanisms. Our study therefore provides managers with clear 
insights into when supplier management practices can act in a complementary fashion. The good 
news for managers is that no matter which aspects of TBL performance measure they prioritize 
(i.e., environmental, social or economic performance), higher levels of EC and EE will always lead 
to higher performance. Therefore “trust, but verify” approaches are the most adequate as 
complementary mechanisms are in place. Accordingly, firms should not only collaborate with 
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suppliers, but also implement audits and controls at the same time. The fear that a high level of 
controls can dissipate trust is not relevant in this scenario.  
 Unfortunately, firms often do not have the internal resources for such a high level of 
sustainability activity. Our results clearly indicate that firms should make a clear decision in such 
cases. If environmental and social performances are highly valued, EC practices should be 
implemented more strongly than EE practices as this provides best performance outcome. Most 
importantly, firms need not avoid situations where EE and EC are implemented at medium levels 
assuming that this could send mixed signals to suppliers and their performance could subsequently 
diminish. At the same time, it is important to understand that while adopting medium levels of EE 
and EC is preferable than having high levels of EE and low levels of EC, its performance is lower 
when compared to adopting high levels of EC and low levels of EE. In summary, when taken 
together, these recommendations provide a very clear guidance to managers on how much 
investment they should allocate to sustainability practices along their supply base so as to capture 
optimal performance benefits. 
Limitations and Future Research 
First, though this study includes EC and EE as dimensions of transactional and relational 
mechanisms respectively, we believe that future research could extend this study by considering 
other transactional and relational mechanisms within the domain of environmental management. 
Second, this study focused only on the supply-side environmental mechanisms. Future research 
should also consider including transactional and relational mechanism from the customer 
perspective as well. Third, our analysis was based on subjective responses from survey 
respondents. In spite of the various survey design steps taken, subjective responses might induce 
biases, specifically for dependent performance variables. Therefore, we recommend future research 
to explore our hypothesized relationships by incorporating objective measurements for 
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performance and other key variables in our model. Fourth, though a wide range of industries were 
included in the final sample, the sampling frame consisted of only the ISM members within the 
USA. Additionally, though the sample size was sufficient, a larger sample could increase our 
result’s generalizability. Accordingly, we suggest that future research replicate our study using a 
larger sample involving domestic as well as international respondents. Finally, the hypothesized 
relationships were evaluated using cross-sectional data. But the combined effects of EC and EE 
could be better explained using longitudinal data. In spite of these limitations, we believe that our 
study makes invaluable scholarly contribution on the complementary effects of EC and EE. 
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Table 1 








 Indicator                                       Standard 
 (Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability, average variance extracted)                                                 coefficient‡ 
 
 Environmental collaboration ( = 0.95; CR = 0.95; AVE = 0.76)  
 We cooperate with our suppliers to achieve environmental objectives.  0.84 
 We provide our suppliers with design specification that include environmental  0.88 
      requirements for purchased items. 
 We encourage our suppliers to develop new source reduction strategies.  0.82 
 We cooperate with our suppliers to improve their waste reduction initiatives.  0.87 
 We work with our suppliers for cleaner production.  0.89 
 We collaborate with our suppliers to provide materials, equipment, parts, and/or services  0.93 
      that support our environmental goals. 
 
 Environmental evaluation ( = 0.94; CR = 0.94; AVE = 0.85) 
 We conduct regular environmental audits into our suppliers’ internal operations.  0.88 
 We periodically evaluate our suppliers’ environmentally friendly practices.  0.97 
 We make site visits to suppliers’ premises to help them improve their eco-performance.  0.91 





Model fit indices: Normed Chi-Square (NC) = 2.32 (≤ 3.0); Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 0.98 (≥ 0.90); Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.99 (≥ 0.90); 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = 0.096 (≤ 0.10); Root Mean Square Residual (RMSR) = 0.03 (≤ 0.08). 
Note: * items dropped during instrument development process; ‡ All loadings are significant at p < 0.01 Level 
 
 Indicator                                       Standard 
 (Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability, average variance extracted)                                                 coefficient‡ 
 
 Economic performance ( = 0.84;CR = 0.81; AVE = 0.47) 
 Decrease in cost of materials purchased. 0.62 
 Decrease in cost of energy consumption. 0.68 
 Decrease in fee for waste discharge. 0.61 
 Improvement in return on investment. 0.75 
 Improvement in earnings per share. 0.73 
  
 Environmental performance ( = 0.92; CR = 0.92; AVE = 0.69)  
 Reduction in air emission. 0.87 
 Reduction in waste (water and/or solid).  0.86 
 Decrease in consumption of hazardous/harmful/toxic materials. 0.75 
 Decrease in frequency for environmental accidents. 0.80 
 Increase in energy saved due to conservation and efficiency improvements.  0.85 
 
 Social performance ( = 0.92; CR = 0.91; AVE = 0.68)  
 Improvement in overall stakeholder welfare or betterment.  0.77 
 Improvement in community health and safety. 0.76 
 Reduction in environmental impacts and risks to general public. 0.94 
 Improvement in occupational health and safety of employees. 0.78 
 Improved awareness and protection of the claims and rights of people  0.84 
     in community served. 
Model fit indices:  NC = 1.56 (≤ 3.0); NNFI = 0.96 (≥ 0.90); CFI = 0.97 (≥ 0.90); RMSEA = 0.06 (≤ 0.10); RMSR= 0.07 (≤ 0.08) 
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Table 3 







     a Non-economic performance - Second-order factor including environmental and social performance.     




 Factors                         Mean       S.D.             EC      EE      ECP    ENP    SOP 
 
 Environmental collaboration (EC)  4.097 1.436  0.87
a
 
 Environmental evaluation (EE)  3.359 1.640  0.73
b
  0.92 
 Economic performance (ECP)  4.653 1.166  0.35  0.41  0.69 
 Environmental performance (ENP)  4.918 1.328  0.54  0.44  0.55  0.83 





 Number of employees (EMP)  0.483 0.501  0.11  0.10  0.07  0.10  0.07 
 Annual sales volume (SAL)  0.662 0.475  0.09  0.18  0.03  0.04  0.06 
  
a
 The square root of the construct’s AVE is provided along the diagonal (given in bold). 
 Off-diagonal numbers are the Pearson correlation between the constructs.  
 
 
                      Dependent 
 ECP ENP SOP 
EC  0.124    0.425
**
    0.348
**
 
EE    0.200
*
 0.105 0.081 
EC
2
  -0.088 0.078 -0.018 
EC*EE    0.174
*
 -0.111  0.001 
EE
2
   -0.099
*
 0.018 0.028 
Shape along the 
symmetry line 
b1 + b2      0.324
**
     0.530
**
     0.429
**
 
b3 + b4 + b5  -0.013 -0.015   0.011 
Shape along the 
asymmetry line 
b1 - b2  -0.076     0.320
+
   0.267 
b3 - b4 + b5   -0.361
*
   0.207   0.009 










  0.18 0.28 0.25 
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Figure 1 
Response surface - symmetry and asymmetry lines. 
   
 
Figure 2 





















































Joint effects of EC and EE on environmental performance. 
               
Figure 4 
Joint effects of EC and EE on social performance. 
    
En
vi
ro
n
m
en
ta
l p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
So
ci
al
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
